Measuring Success

By, Wendy Day from Rap Coalition (www.WendyDay.com)

One of the many changing things in the urban music business is how we measure the success of an artist. Measuring Rap, R&B, Reggae, and even Dance music sales has always been challenging, and even though companies like the Neilsen-owned SoundScan claim to have been 100% effective, they were not.

SoundScan is a company that began measuring music sales in the early 90s by supplying willing music retailers with special scanners and software that counted and tallied up bar code (UPC) scans at the point of purchase (cash registers). Every Sunday night that tally would be automatically downloaded to SoundScan headquarters in White Plains, NY for publication the following Wednesday to subscribers with very deep pockets (the subscriptions are costly), meaning major record labels.

One of the problems with SoundScan is that it has never been able to measure EVERY sales outlet. Many of the independent retailers around the country, where the bulk of rap sales were happening in the 90s, were reluctant to have any counting system overseeing their business. Whether it was for tax reasons (did not want the IRS to know how much music they were really selling) or for business reasons (fear that a chain store would get their retail sales information and open a store directly across the street with lower prices thereby putting them out of business—which ironically happened anyway), many didn’t want to report their sales to anyone. It also didn’t count venue sales until somewhat recently—and they are self-reported, which means it depends upon the honesty of the person reporting.

To make up for this lack of accurate data, SoundScan weighted certain of the willing-to-report stores more heavily than others. This meant that when an independent store, in say St Louis, scanned one sales copy of a CD, it could count as four sold copies to make up for the area’s lack of actual SoundScan reporters. Additionally, many of the SoundScan stores realized early on that there was a business to be made of selling SoundScan scans to labels. Aside from being treated better by the labels because they were a SoundScan reporter (meaning promo dollars spent in their stores for key pricing and positioning campaigns), an economy of “seeding” sprung up around the country which caused labels to send extra boxes of CDs to retailers for additional scans for a price. Some would scan the chosen CD at the register daily no matter what other title was sold, while others would receive boxes of free product to scan throughout the week. Smart labels controlled the scans and made it appear as natural as possible, sometimes to have a big first week (hitting #1 on the Billboard chart was a sure way to garner extra press and attention which led to additional sales) and sometimes indie labels used this method to land a bigger deal with a major label.

Buying SoundScan in urban music (at least in the areas in which I travelled) became such a popular practice that when I was shopping deals at the major labels from 1995 to 2005, I used to separate out the SoundScan sales from the independent retailers, and if it was more than 15% of overall sales by the artist, I knew (and the major labels knew) they were buying SoundScan. I would pass on shopping those deals because I knew the Major labels would see the fraud and I didn’t want that fake shit to sully my otherwise stellar reputation for doing deals (I’m proud to say that I’ve done some of the best deals in urban music from 1995 to 2005 when there were good deals to be had). I was proud that my deals led to superstar sales levels (except two) and fake scans weren’t the way to achieve superstar status (at least not as an indie).

In the early years of the 21st century, however, I watched urban sales switch from a full length CD marketplace to a downloaded singles market. I also watched Best Buy and WalMart—the biggest music retailers become replaced by iTunes in importance and overall sales volume. I also noticed that the core rap fans were not really the active downloaders, the mainstream and pop fans were. So while 50 Cent and Kanye West were fighting illegal downloads, artists like Young Jeezy, Boosie and Webbie were still able to sell large amounts of CDs, especially in the South. I watched an increase of bootlegged CDs pop up at carwashes and swap meets throughout the ‘hoods in the South though, as CDs sold 3 for $10 in most cases, and as the RIAA resorted to suing college kids for illegal downloading instead of shutting down the shops with multiple burners to bootleg CDs. Music became “free” (or close to free) among an entire new generation of fans.

In a way, this shift benefits the indie artists who are out here selling their own CDs. Enterprising bootleggers don’t mass produce music until there is a mass market of sales, and the fans still seem to admire and support the grind of artists who sell their CDs hand to hand, or who travel from town to town promoting their music regionally. While artists and major labels all around me were complaining of bootlegging and lost revenue, I watched the TMI Boyz sell hundreds of thousands of CDs while on the road for almost 18 months straight. Very little of it was measurable by SoundScan.

But even with the inaccuracies in the SoundScan system, the urban music industry used to be able to measure the sales, the response to promotional and marketing efforts, and measure the buzz or hype an artist had. We could see it in the attendance at shows, merchandise sold, and CDs sold. More importantly, we could measure it by area. When I was managing David Banner and Twista, this was important because I knew what areas to target with shows based on sales data, radio spins, and buzz factor. And consequently, knew what areas to target to increase our sales, make sure product was heavy in stores in certain areas, and could target our campaign effectively around those key target areas (Banner was heavy in MS, Washington DC, IL, TN, AL, and GA; while Twista’s main fanbase was IL, TX, LA, MS, IN, OH, and MO).

When I met the guys from Trill Entertainment in 2004, we saw Lil Boosie’s and Webbie’s largest fan base was northern FL, AL, GA, MS, LA, and TN. It was easy to measure and track. The buzz was easy to measure as well, based on their show bookings every weekend and the sales of the indie CDs in the marketplace mostly in those key markets. When radio adds for Webbie entered the equation, it was a no brainer as to where we should go. We didn’t have to wonder where anonymous downloads were occurring, they weren’t.

Today that measurement process is more challenging. I noticed it when Gucci Mane got out of prison in March of 2009. He had a good buzz on the streets from dropping back to back mixed CDs and from OJ Tha Juiceman keeping Gucci’s name alive while he was locked down. But I don’t think anyone could have predicted the $30,000 to $50,000 per show booking price that he’d command almost instantly, with no album in the marketplace and no hot single at radio (this was months before “Wasted” hit radio). There was no way to measure his buzz prior to that. He was kept busy doing shows but still managed to record mixed CDs and keep music in the marketplace. Most of it was downloaded for free (by his choice) from websites and blogs that had become the way to receive new music. Fans at his shows could sing along, word for word. They didn’t need radio singles.

While his MySpace hits increased and his popularity on Twitter was apparent, there was no legitimate measuring system in place to gauge his media mentions, count the downloads (too many sites had music posted), track the shows and price increases, or measure the increase in success he was experiencing. His increased popularity also led to an increase in popularity of the artists surrounding him: Nicky Minaj, OJ Tha Juiceman, and Wacka Flocka Flame.

In today’s music business economy we have no real accurate (or even semi-accurate) way of measuring success for artists. With SoundScan tracking mainstream sales, only the mainstream artists seem to be faring well (Lil Wayne, Kanye, Taylor Swift, Susan Boyle, etc). Meanwhile, I haven’t heard a decrease of music coming from or playing in the ‘hoods of America. Even without SoundScan sales, kids are singing along to every Gucci Mane and Yo Gotti song during their shows (music is from their mixed CDs). They are listening to a larger number of unknown, independent, and unsigned artists than ever, and they aren’t getting the music just from the internet.

As this change is occurring, I’m watching folks who thrive on research and numbers scramble to count MySpace hits, Twitter and Facebook friends, downloads from myriads of websites and Blog sites (too many different ones to count), World Star and VladTV views, etc. Yet none of it is accurate. Software programs can boost numbers on the web as easily as SoundScan swipes could be duplicated at indie retailers in the 90s. Music magazines are becoming obsolete, so purchases of issues based on our favorite artists on the covers are becoming a thing of the past. I guess we’re going to have to let the fans tell us. And this means we need an even closer one-on-one relationship with the fans, the streets, and the internet. What was as easy as picking up SoundScan reports on Wednesday mornings is no more. Oh how I long for those days….

I guess the key, at least for indie labels, is to keep your eye on the sales and the relationships you are building with fans. Last week, Tom Silverman who built the Tommy Boy Records empire in the 80s and 90s (Afrika Bambaataa, De La Soul, Queen Lafifah, Naughty By Nature, Information Society, Coolio, House of Pain, Everlast, etc) and who owns the New Music Seminar, published a study at www.MusicianCoaching.com . He pointed out that in 2009, there were 1,500 independent releases in all genres. Of those 1500, only 13 releases sold over 10,000 units (that’s only $70,000 to $100,000 in wholesale sales). The #2 release was the label I consulted, TMI Boyz. They were the ONLY rap act on that short list of 13. And that list was based on the (inaccurate) SoundScan sales we tabulated at 30,000 CDs sold. While on the road for a year and a half, they sold 2 mixed CDs and a full length CD. Tom’s research was based solely on the CDs that were sold at FYE stores in the South. Since we weren’t focused on SoundScan, just on making money, we weren’t trying to have each sale counted. The bulk of sales were at shows, Mall parking lots, state fairs, flea markets, street corners, gas stations, car washes, high schools, clubs--anyplace where a mass of people were gathered so TMI Boyz could jump out of the wrapped van to make a sale. You may have never heard of them, but they made $1.6 million in sales in 2009. Isn’t that the best measurement of all? Besides, being #2 is good, too.